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NOTES
CHASTAIN v. SUNDQUIST: A NARROW
READING OF THE DOCTRINE OF
LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY
The doctrine of legislative immunity traditionally has consisted
of immunity under the speech or debate clause of the United States
Constitution.' Until recently, the Supreme Court broadly inter-
preted the speech or debate clause to cover a wide range of legisla-
tive activities. 2 Since 1972, however, the Court has adopted a more
restrictive view of the speech or debate clause.3 The Court has dis-
tinguished between "political" and "legislative" activity and has
concluded that the speech or debate clause only protects "purely
legislative activities." 4 The Court has also created an extra-constitu-
tional body of immunity law that now protects virtually all govern-
ment officials in the judicial and executive branches from civil
liability. 5
Chastain v. Sundquist6 represents the first case in which a mem-
ber of Congress has raised the judicially created doctrine of official
immunity as a defense. A split panel of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held in Sundquist that "members of Con-
gress are not entitled to immunity for common law torts committed
while acting within the scope of their official duties but outside the
sphere protected by the Speech or Debate Clause." 7 The court
placed too much reliance on a speech or debate clause analysis and
failed to consider adequately the merits of Representative Sund-
quist's defense.8 The court's decision jeopardizes the proper func-
1 The speech or debate clause provides that "for any Speech or Debate in either
House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. For the history of the speech or debate clause, see infra notes 12-
18 and accompanying text.
2 See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367, reh'g denied, 342 U.S. 843 (1951); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880);
see also infra notes 31-48 and accompanying text.
3 See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Gravel v. United States, 408
U.S. 606 (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); see also infra notes 49-68
and accompanying text.
4 Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512.
5 See infra notes 69-95 and accompanying text.
6 833 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2914 (1988).
7 Id. at 312.
8 Representative Sundquist stated forthrightly in his brief that he based his de-
fense on official immunity, not the speech or debate clause. Brief for Appellee at 10,
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tioning of members of Congress as representatives of the American
people. The Supreme Court's subsequent denial of Representative
Sundquist's petition for a writ of certiorari9 leaves members of Con-
gress with a Hobson's choice: 10 either they can speak out on issues
important to their constituents and risk liability, or they can remain
silent in public and confine their legislative activity to the halls of
Congress."
Part I of this Note reviews the development of the doctrine of
legislative immunity. Section A examines the history of the speech
or debate clause and judicial decisions interpreting its scope. Sec-
tion B discusses the judicially created doctrine of official immunity
and its application to officials of the judicial and executive branches.
Part II describes the facts of the Sundquist case and the court's ra-
tionale for its opinion. Part III exposes the flaws in the court's deci-
sion by focusing particular attention on three issues. First, this Note
criticizes the court's narrow definition of legislative activity and de-
scribes the implications of this narrow definition on essential legisla-
tive functions. Second, this Note addresses the important policy
considerations that favor granting members of Congress official im-
munity. Third, this Note suggests that if courts refuse to expand
either the scope of the speech or debate clause or extend official
immunity to members of Congress, then Congress should enact a
statutory grant of legislative immunity.
I
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF LEGISLATIVE
IMMUNITY
A. Speech or Debate Clause Immunity
1. Origins of the Speech or Debate Clause
The concept of immunity for legislators from judicial process
arose out of the protracted struggle between the English Crown and
Parliament that culminated in the Glorious Revolution of 1688.12
The Glorious Revolution secured Parliament's independence from
the Crown and provided the impetus for the English Bill of Rights
Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (No. 86-5386), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 2914 (1988).
9 Sundquist, 108 S. Ct. 2914 (1988).
10 Thomas Hobson, a seventeenth century English liveryman, required every cus-
tomer to take the horse nearest the door. WEBSTER's NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICIONARY 574 (1988).
11 See 134 CONG. REC. H3193 (daily ed. May 12, 1988) (statement of Rep. Hughes).
12 RobertJ. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silvergate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of
Powers, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1113, 1120-21 (1973).
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of 1689.13 The English Bill of Rights specifically guaranteed mem-
bers of Parliament the privileges of speech or debate: "That the
Freedom of Speech, and Debates or Proceedings in Parliament,
ought not to be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out
of Parliament."14
The drafters of the United States Constitution recognized the
importance of the legislative privilege in our system of govern-
ment. 15 They viewed the privilege as a bulwark against judicial and
executive encroachment on the independence of Congress. 16 The
drafters incorporated the privilege in article I, section 6, clause 1 of
the Constitution: "[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House,
[Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other
Place."'1 7 James Wilson, one of the principal architects of the
speech or debate clause, stated:
In order to enable and encourage a representative of the publick
to discharge his publick trust with firmness and success, it is indis-
pensably necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of
speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of
every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty
may occasion offence.' 8
The first test of the speech or debate clause occurred in 1797.
In that year, the Adams administration challenged the freedom of
Congress to criticize the executive branch.' 9 Several anti-Federalist
members of Congress had sent newsletters to their constituents crit-
icizing the President's foreign policy in the undeclared war with
France.20 A federal grand jury levied indictments against the con-
gressmen for distributing "unfounded calumnies" against the gov-
ernment.21  Thomas Jefferson denounced the grand jury's
investigation as a manifest violation of the legislative privilege and
of the doctrine of separation of powers. 22 Jefferson's protest clearly
elucidates the purposes and scope of the speech or debate clause. 23
13 See Note, The Bribed Congressman's Immunity from Prosecution, 75 YALE L.J. 335, 336
(1965).
14 1 W. & M., ch. 2 (1689).
15 See Reinstein & Silvergate, supra note 12, at 1139.
16 Id.
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
18 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 421 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967) [hereinafter J.
WILSON].
19 Comment, Brewster, Gravel, and Legislative Immunity, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 125, 127
(1973).
20 See Reinstein & Silvergate, supra note 12, at 1140.
21 8 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 325 (Ford ed. 1904) [hereinafter T.
JEFFERSON].
22 Reinstein & Silvergate, supra note 12, at 1141.
23 See T. JEFFERSON, supra note 21, at 322-3 1:
[F]or the judiciary to interpose in the legislative department between the
386 [Vol. 75:384
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Jefferson stated that "representatives, in the discharge of their func-
tions, should be free from the cognizance or coercion of the coordi-
nate branches, Judiciary and Executive; and that their
communications with their constituents should of right, as of duty
also, be free, full, and unawed by any .... "24
2. Judicial Interpretation of the Speech or Debate Clause
The drafters intended the speech or debate clause to preserve
the independence and integrity of the legislature.25 The Founding
Fathers recognized that the existence of the privilege enabled mem-
bers of Congress to perform their functions with "firmness and suc-
cess" 26 without fear of retaliatory litigation.27 James Madison
advised that "the reason and necessity of the privilege" should
guide judicial illumination of the clause.28 The Supreme Court
adopted a broad interpretation of the privilege in the few opportu-
nities it had to define its scope prior to 1972.29 Recent decisions of
the Court, however, indicate a preference for a more restrictive view
of the scope of the privilege.30
a. Pre-1972 Interpretation
The first judicial decision interpreting the speech or debate
clause concluded that it afforded legislators a broad privilege in the
performance of their duties. In Coffin v. Coffin,3' Chief Justice Par-
sons of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts argued that
courts should construe the privilege liberally. 32 Parsons supported
constituent and his representative, to control them in the exercise of their
functions or duties towards each other, to overawe the free correspon-
dence which exists and ought to exist between them, to dictate what com-
munications may pass between them, and to punish all others, to put the
representative into jeopardy of criminal prosecution, of vexation, ex-
pense, and punishment before the Judiciary, if his communications, pub-
lic or private, do not exactly square with their ideas of fact or right, or
with their designs of wrong, is to put the legislative department under the
feet of the Judiciary, is to leave us, indeed, the shadow, but to take away the
substance of representation ... . is to do away the influence of the people over
the proceedings of their representatives by excluding from their knowl-
edge, by the terror of punishment, all but such information or misinfor-
mation as may suit their own views ....
Id. at 322 (emphasis added).
24 Id. at 322.
25 United States v.Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966); Reinstein & Silvergate, supra
note 12, at 1121; Comment, supra note 19, at 151.
26 See J. WILSON, supra note 18, at 421.
27 See infra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
28 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 221 (Philadelphia 1865).
29 See infra notes 31-48 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 49-68 and accompanying text.
31 4 Mass. 1 (1808).
32 Id. at 27. The court stated:
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an expansive interpretation of the privilege that extended its protec-
tion to activities beyond the walls of the legislative chamber.33
The United States Supreme Court first interpreted the speech
or debate clause in Kilbourn v. Thompson.34 Kilbourn involved a chal-
lenge to the power of the United States House of Representatives to
incarcerate a recalcitrant witness for contempt of the House.35 The
Court held that the speech or debate clause barred Kilbourn's ac-
tion for false imprisonment brought against several members of the
House.36 The Court adopted the Coffin court's liberal construction
of the privilege 37 and recognized that limiting the application of the
speech or debate clause to "words spoken in debate" would unduly
narrow its scope.38 The Court also endorsed the view expressed in
Coffin that the protection of the speech or debate clause extends be-
yond the geographic confines of Congress. 39
Seventy years passed before the' Supreme Court again ad-
dressed the scope of immunity afforded legislators under the speech
or debate clause. In Tenney v. Brandhove,40 the Court considered the
issue of whether the privilege protected members of a state investi-
gative committee against a suit brought under the Civil Rights Act
of 1871.41 Writing for the majority, Justice Frankfurter stated that
These privileges are thus secured, not with the intention of protect-
ing the members against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to sup-
port the rights of the people, by enabling their representatives to execute
the functions of their office without fear of prosecutions, civil or criminal.
I therefore think that the article ought not to be construed strictly, but
liberally, that the full design of it may be answered .... I would define
the article as securing to every member exemption from prosecution, for
everything said or done by him, as a representative, in the exercise of the
functions of that office, without enquiring whether the exercise was regu-
lar according to the rules of the house, or irregular and against their
rules.
Id.
33 Id. ("[Tihere are cases, in which [the representative] is entitled to this privilege,
when not within the walls of the representatives' chamber.").
34 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
35 Id. at 181. Kilbourn arose out of a congressional investigation into the bankruptcy
of a firm in debt to the federal government. After Kilbourn refused to answer questions
and produce certain documents, the House charged him with contempt and dispatched
Thompson, the sergeant-at-arms of the House, to arrest him. Kilbourn spent 45 days in
the common jail of the District of Columbia.
36 Id. at 205.
37 Id. at 204. In his opinion for the Court,Justice Miller described the Coffin case as
"perhaps the most authoritative case in this country on the construction of the provision
in regard to freedom of debate in legislative bodies .... " Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 203-04.
40 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
41 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1982). Brandhove had circulated a petition in the Cali-
fornia legislature calling for an end to the funding of the Tenney Committee on Un-




the sole judicial inquiry was whether the defendant legislators had
acted "in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity." 42 The Court
held that the speech or debate clause protected the defendants since
they were acting in a field where legislators traditionally have power
to act.43 The Court's broad interpretation of the privilege but-
tressed the precedents set in Coffin and Kilbourn.
The Supreme Court also endorsed a liberal construction of the
speech or debate clause in United States v. Johnson.44 The Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether the speech or debate clause barred a
criminal prosecution based upon an allegation that a member of
Congress had conspired to give a particular speech on the floor of
the House of Representatives in return for remuneration from pri-
vate interests. 45 Writing for the majority, Justice Harlan explained
that "the tradition of legislative privilege is . . . well established in
our polity ... "46 He stated that the immunity afforded legislators
under the speech or debate clause provides "an important protec-
tion of the independence and integrity of the legislature." 47 The
Court concluded that the speech or debate clause extends at least so
far as to prevent executive and judicial inquiry into motives underly-
ing the making of a speech. 48
b. Post-1972 Interpretations
Recent Supreme Court decisions have chipped away at the
scope of the speech or debate clause. The trend began in 1972 with
the Court's decisions in United States v. Brewster49 and Gravel v. United
States.50 The Brewster case involved Senator Brewster's alleged solic-
itation and acceptance of a bribe.5' The Court distinguished be-
tween "political" and "legislative" activity and held that the speech
or debate clause only protected "purely legislative activities." 5 2 The
Court's dichotomization excluded a wide range of legislative activi-
ties from the protection of the speech or debate clause. The Court
stated:
It is well known, of course, that Members of the Congress
engage in many activities other than the purely legislative activi-
42 Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376.
43 Id. at 379.
44 383 U.S. 169 (1966). Justice Harlan pronounced "that the legislative privilege
will be read broadly to effectuate its purposes .... " Id. at 180.
45 Id. at 171-72.
46 Id. at 179.
47 Id. at 178.
48 Id. at 180.
49 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
50 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
51 Brewster, 408 U.S. at 502-03.
52 Id. at 512.
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ties protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. These include a
wide range of legitimate 'errands' performed for constituents, the
making of appointments with Government agencies, assistance in
securing Government contracts, preparing so-called 'news letters'
to constituents, news releases, and speeches delivered outside the
Congress. 53
The Court concluded that, "[a]lthough these are entirely legitimate
activities, they are political in nature rather than legislative" and
thus fall outside the protection of the speech or debate clause.54
The Gravel case involved Senator Gravel's conduct at a meeting
of the Senate Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Grounds. 55 At
that meeting, Senator Gravel read extensively from a copy of The
Pentagon Papers and then placed the entire forty-seven volumes of
that study in the public record. 56 Senator Gravel later arranged for
the private publication of the record.57 The Court adopted a nar-
row definition of legislative activity. 58 It excluded Senator Gravel's
acquisition of materials for the committee meeting and his arrange-
ments for the private publication of the record from the protection
of the speech or debate clause.5 9
The Supreme Court's restrictive definition of legislative activity
in Brewster and Gravel prompted the Joint Committee on Congres-
sional Operations to initiate an inquiry into the constitutional im-
munity of members of Congress. 60 Representative Cleveland noted
in his opening statement before the Committee that the Court's def-
inition of the legislative role of a member of Congress suggested
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Gravel, 408 U.S. at 609-10.
56 Id. at 609.
The Pentagon Papers was a top-secret study of United States involvement in Viet-
nam from 1945 to 1967. See THE PENTAGON PAPERS: THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT HIS-
TORY OF UNITED STATES DECISION MAKING ON VIETNAM (Sen. Michael Gravel ed. 1971).
Justice Douglas described the story of The Pentagon Papers as "a chronicle of suppres-
sion of vital decisions to protect the reputations and political hides of men who worked
an amazingly successful scheme of deception on the American people." Gravel, 408 U.S.
at 647 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
57 Gravel, 408 U.S. at 609-10.
58 Id. at 625:
Legislative acts are not all-encompassing. The heart of the Clause is
speech or debate in either House. Insofar as the Clause is construed to
reach other matters, they must be an integral part of the deliberative and
communicative processes by which Members participate in committee
and House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or
rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which
the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House.
59 Id. at 622.
60 JoINT COMM. ON CONGRESSIONAL OPERATIONS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMMUNITY




that "the Court labors in abysmal ignorance of the real processes of
representative government." 61 Other members of the Joint Com-
mittee expressed similar displeasure with the Court's recent deci-
sions. 62 The Joint Committee concluded that legislative activities
are not limited to the enactment of laws. 63 It defined legislative ac-
tivities as "any activities undertaken within the legislative branch in
fulfilling the role of the Congress in the constitutionally defined
government of coordinate and coequal branches." 64 The Joint
Committee emphasized that the definition of protected legislative
activities should include anything a member of Congress does as a
representative of a constituency. 65
The Supreme Court remained impervious to theJoint Commit-
tee's recommendations. In 1979, the Court's decision in Hutchinson
v. Proxmire 6 6 further narrowed its interpretation of the speech or de-
bate clause. The Court held that the speech or debate clause did
not immunize Senator Proxmire from liability for defamatory state-
ments made in newsletters and press releases in connection with his
"Golden Fleece of the Month Award."' 67 Although the Court recog-
nized the importance of informing the public and other Congress-
men of wasteful spending, it held that the transmittal of such
information is "not a part of the legislative function or the delibera-
tions that make up the legislative process."'68
B. The Judicially Created Doctrine of Official Immunity
The Supreme Court has fashioned an extra-constitutional body
of immunity law to protect government officials from civil liability. 69
In this context, the Court has applied a functional approach to im-
munity questions under which it examines the nature of an official's
functions and determines whether the exercise of those functions
61 Constitutional Immunity of Members of Congress: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Con-
gressional Operations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 5 (1973) [hereinafter Hearings, pt. 1]
(statement of Rep. Cleveland).
62 Id. at 9 (statement of Rep. Brooks) ("[W]e are not bound to agree when the court
so narrowly interprets the clause as to exclude from the immunity it affords, important
and substantial functions of the representative role of a Member of Congress.").
63 REPORT, supra note 60, at 53.
64 Id. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
65 REPORT, supra note 60, at 47. The Joint Committee stated, "An individual Mem-
ber of Congress performs many various duties in his or her official capacity. A Member
is a legislator; he is a representative of a constituency, as well-an ombudsman for an
electorate in the nation's capital."
66 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
67 Id. at 114. Senator Proxmire awarded the Golden Fleece Award to three federal
agencies for sponsoring Hutchinson's research into why a monkey clenches its jaw under
stress. Id. at 115-16.
68 Id. at 133.
69 See Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 315.
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necessitates immunity. 70 The judicially created doctrine of official
immunity now protects virtually all officials in the judicial and exec-
utive branches from civil liability. 71
1. Judicial Privilege
The Supreme Court extended absolute immunity to judges
over a century ago in Bradley v. Fisher.72 In the trial of John Surratt
for his participation in the conspiracy to assassinate President Lin-
coln, the trial judge disbarred Surratt's attorney.73 The attorney
filed an action against the trial judge. In denying his claim, the
Court held that federal judges were entitled to absolute immunity
for their judicial acts. 74 The Court founded the doctrine ofjudicial
privilege upon the "general principle of highest importance to the
proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising
the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convic-
tions, without apprehension of personal consequences to him-
self."7 - Judicial privilege applies not only to actual decisions, but
also to defamatory statements made in the course of judicial pro-
ceedings. 76 In addition, the protection afforded judges extends to
officials who exercise "quasi-judicial" authority. 77
Two policy considerations support the grant of absolute immu-
nity. First, fear of personal liability would detract from the indepen-
dence and impartiality of judicial action.78 Second, suits against
judges might impinge upon their time at the public's expense. 79 On
the other hand, any grant of immunity imposes certain costs. The
Supreme Court's recognition of judicial privilege, for example, has
eliminated a potential deterrent to irresponsible judicial action and
a potential remedy to the victims ofjudicial misconduct. 80 Several
restraints within the judicial system keep these costs acceptably low,
however, and minimize the possibility of injury at the hands of an
70 Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988).
71 See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
72 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
73 Id. at 344. The trial judge disbarred Surratt's attorney after he had threatened
the judge with "personal chastisement" for allegedly hurling a series of insults at him
from the bench. For a complete account of the Surratt trial, see Louis J. WEICHMANN, A
TRUE HISTORY OF THE AsSASSINArION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND OF THE CONSPIRACY OF
1865, at 354-79 (1975).
74 Bradley, 80 U.S. at 347.
75 Id.
76 See Joel F. Handler & William A. Klein, The Defense of Privilege in Defamation Suits
Against Government Executive Officials, 74 HARV. L. REV. 44, 53 (1960).
77 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n.20 (1976) (grand jurors); Yaselli v.
Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'dper curiam, 275 U.S. 503 (1927) (prosecutors).







In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court extended the
doctrine of official immunity to protect federal executive officers. 82
In Spalding v. Vilas,83 a defamation action against the Postmaster
General, the Court concluded that the head of an executive depart-
ment possessed absolute immunity for acts taken in his official
capacity. The Court stated that the proper and effective administra-
tion of public affairs required the extension of the doctrine of offi-
cial immunity to high-ranking executive officials. 8 4
The Supreme Court expanded the doctrine of absolute execu-
tive immunity in Barr v. Matteo.85 A plurality of the Court held that a
low-level federal administrative official performing a discretionary
act within the scope of his duties enjoyed absolute immunity from
liability in a defamation action.86 The Court premised its holding
on a functional approach to immunity questions.8 7 The outcome in
Barr sanctions a greatly broadened scope of immunized activity.88
The Court clearly stated its intention to expand the parameters of
the doctrine of official immunity: "We do not think the principle
announced in Vilas can properly be restricted to executive officers of
cabinet rank .... The privilege is not a badge or emolument of
exalted office, but an expression of policy designed to aid in the
effective functioning of government."8 9
In the thirty years since the Barr decision, lower federal courts
have extended the doctrine of official immunity to public officials of
virtually every rank.90 Even dog catchers enjoy the protection of of-
81 Id. at 54-55. Handler & Klein identified four principal restraints against irre-
sponsible judicial conduct. First, the aggrieved party is entitled to appellate review of
judicial decisions. Second, the adversary system affords ample opportunity for the ag-
grieved party to vindicate himself. Third, procedures exist to disqualify a judge before
trial. Fourth, judges recognize the importance of maintaining dignity and fairness in
judicial proceedings. Id. at 54.
82 Mayer G. Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Congressional Violations: An Analysis
and a Critique, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 526, 530 (1977).
83 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
84 Id. at 498.
85 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
86 Id. at 574. In Barr, employees of the Federal Office of Rent Stabilization had
sued the acting director for defamatory statements contained in a press release, which
criticized the employees' actions in devising and implementing within the Office a budg-
etary plan that had come under congressional attack. Id. at 565-67.
87 Id. at 572-73; see also Note, An Examination of Immunity for Federal Executive Officials,
28 ViLL. L. REv. 956, 964 (1982-83) (authored by Paul J. Kennedy).
88 Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 321.
89 Barr, 360 U.S. at 572-73.
90 See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (NASA center director); Strothman
v. Gefreh, 739 F.2d 515 (10th Cir. 1984) (administrative lawjudges); George v. Kay, 632
1990] 393
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ficial immunity.9' Recent decisions of the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit have con-
firmed that Barr remains good law.92 In Doe v. McMillan,93 the
Supreme Court even mentioned in a footnote that the doctrine of
official immunity "has been held applicable to officials of the Legis-
lative Branch." 94 Nevertheless, in Chastain v. Sundquist,95 a split
panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
refused to extend official immunity to members of Congress.
II
DUTY OR DEFAMATION: CHASTAIN V SUNDQUIST
A. Factual Background
The Honorable Don Sundquist has served as the United States
Representative for the Seventh District of Tennessee since 1983.96
In 1978, a major public controversy developed in Memphis between
the Memphis Area Legal Services (MALS) and the Juvenile Court of
Memphis and Shelby County.97 The juvenile court supervises the
collection of child support payments from parents. MALS alleged
that the procedures used to collect the child support payments vio-
lated the constitutional rights of indigent parents. 98 In 1985, Rep-
resentative Sundquist wrote a letter to the Attorney General of the
F.2d 1103 (4th Cir. 1980) (postal inspector), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981); Expedi-
tions Unlimited Aquatic Enterprises, Inc. v. Smithsonian Institution, 566 F.2d 289 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (en banc) (Smithsonian department chairman), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915
(1978); Mandel v. Nouse, 509 F.2d 1031 (6th Cir.) (Army commander), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1008 (1975); Sowders v. Damron, 457 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir. 1972) (Internal Reve-
nue officers).
91 See Allred v. Svarczkopf, 573 F.2d 1146 (10th Cir. 1978) (qualified immunity de-
fense available to Animal Control Officer against dog owner's claim that he violated her
civil rights in arresting her for refusing to sign a citation); Kostiuk v. Town of Riverhead,
570 F. Supp. 603 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (qualified immunity defense available to dog catcher
against dog owner's claim that one-night impoundment of owner's dog was an unconsti-
tutional deprivation of property).
92 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807-08 (1982) (citing Barr and Spalding v.
Vilas with approval regarding officials' "absolute immunity from suits at common law");
see also McKinney v. Whitfield, 736 F.2d 766, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing Harlow as "sig-
nalling that Barr remains good law").
93 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
94 Id. at 319 n.13. See Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 331 (Mikva, J., dissenting):
This statement, taken on its face, supports Sundquist's position-indeed,
decides this case. But the very brevity of this statement-and its location
in a footnote-give some pause. Because it is impossible to discern the
precise meaning the Court intended this statement to carry, it cannot be
relied upon with great confidence.
95 833 F.2d 311.
96 CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY: 100T CONG. 194-95 (1987-88). The seventh dis-
trict consists in large part of the suburbs of Memphis.




United States expressing his concern that MALS had launched a
concerted effort to discredit a major federally funded child support
enforcement program. Sundquist leveled direct criticism at Wayne
Chastain, a MALS attorney, for participating in activities designed
to obstruct the administration of the Child Support Enforcement
Laws.99 Sundquist distributed a copy of the letter to the Memphis
media. Representative Sundquist reiterated his concern about
MALS in a letter to the Legal Services Corporation (LSC). MALS is
a federally funded agency under the aegis of the LSC.
B. Trial Court Decision
Chastain filed suit against Representative Sundquist in the Su-
perior Court for the District of Columbia. 10 0 Sundquist removed
the action to the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia. 10' Judge Richey granted Sundquist's motion to dismiss
based on the doctrine of official immunity. Judge Richey held that
the speech or debate clause protected Sundquist's communications
with the Attorney General and with the LSC. 10 2 He also held that
the release of the letter to the media fell within the grant of absolute
immunity to federal officials for common law torts.'0 3
Judge Richey recognized that members of Congress deserve at
least as much protection as other government officials. He em-
braced a functional approach 10 4 and held that both the speech or
debate clause and the judicially created doctrine of official immunity
entitled Representative Sundquist's letters to absolute immunity.' 0 5
He stated that the "doctrine of immunity is in large measure based
on practical considerations designed and existing primarily to pro-
99 Id. at 313. The court quoted from Representative Sundquist's letter to the Attor-
ney General:
Also, MALS seems to be employing at least one attorney, Wayne Chas-
tain, to do nothing but harass Juvenile Court Judge Kenneth A. Turner
and court referees Curtis S. Person, Jr. and William Ray Ingram. Mr
Chastain works in concert with two convicted felons, Paul A. Savarin and
Richard E. Love. Those individuals and Mrs. Alma Morris, the MALS
client council chairperson, call frequent press conferences and stage
street demonstrations against the Juvenile Court.
100 Id. The complaint alleged five counts of defamation. Chastain sought
$1,000,000 in monetary damages.
101 Id.
102 Appellant's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 54a, Chastain v. Sundquist, 833
F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2914 (1988).
103 Id.
104 See infra notes 148-58 and accompanying text.
105 Appellant's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 45a, Chastain v. Sundquist, 833
F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2914 (1988). ("[W]hether those letters
were defamatory or not, they are entitled to absolute [speech or debate clause] immu-
nity as official acts ..... as well as absolute immunity for common law torts under well-
established and long-established principles of law ....").
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tect the efficient operation of government."' 10 6 In conclusion, Judge
Richey warned that failure to extend official immunity to members
of Congress would have a chilling effect on the exercise of their du-
ties and restrict the informing function of Congress. 10 7
C. Disposition on Appeal
Chastain appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Although Representative
Sundquist again raised the doctrine of official immunity as a de-
fense, a split panel of the court of appeals reversed the lower court's
decision. The court addressed two major issues in its opinion.
First, the court discussed whether the speech or debate clause pro-
tected Representative Sundquist's letters to the Attorney General
and the LSC. Second, the court considered whether the judicially
created doctrine of official immunity should extend to members of
Congress.
The court first addressed the issue of whether the speech or
debate clause protected interbranch communications 10 8  and
adopted the Supreme Court's position that the clause protects only
"4purely legislative activities."' 1 9 The court concluded that the
speech or debate clause did not shield Representative Sundquist's
letters to the Attorney General and the LSC. The majority also held
that Sundquist's statements to the public did not constitute legisla-
tive activity and therefore did not fall within the scope of the
clause. 110 The court's resolution of the first issue followed the
Supreme Court's conclusion in Hutchinson v. Proxmire that attempts
to influence the conduct of executive agencies do not fall within the
protection of the speech or debate clause."'
The court devoted the rest of its opinion to the official immu-
nity issue. The majority noted that the Supreme Court has fash-
ioned an extra-constitutional body of immunity law to supplement
106 Id. at 54a-55a.
107 Id at 56a:
[I]f this court were to hold otherwise ... it would act, in effect, as a re-
straint on the exercise of the duties by a legislative official in respect to
matters with wide public interest and concern, which would be far worse
than a favorable expression on such matters and that if Congressman
Sundquist, or any other Member .... were so restricted as the plaintiff's
kinds of actions here would restrict them, then we would have very little
information coming out from the Members of Congress in the way of
information involving broad-ranging public policies and, as a result, the
public interest would suffer.
See infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
108 Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 313.
109 United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972).
110 Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 314-15.
111 Id. (citing Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 121 n.10 (1979)).
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grants of immunity found in the Constitution. Furthermore, the
court stated that all other public officials receive the protection of
the doctrine of official immunity when engaged in official activi-
ties. 112 Despite these findings, the court concluded that "members
of Congress expressly cannot claim immunity from defamatory
statements unprotected by the Speech or Debate Clause." 113 The
majority's conclusion rested on their belief that the doctrine of leg-
islative immunity does not extend beyond the parameters of the
speech or debate clause. 114
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Mikva sharply criticized the major-
ity opinion. Mikva argued that the majority mechanically read the
Constitution as if it were a collection of mutually exclusive boxes." 5
He disagreed with the majority's position that members of Congress
cannot qualify for the judicially created doctrine of official immunity
simply because the Constitution provides a certain measure of pro-
tection under the speech or debate clause. 116 The dissent empha-
sized the importance of a functional approach to immunity
questions and the need to assess important policy considerations
weighing in favor of extending official immunity to members of
Congress." 7 In particular, Judge Mikva argued that the majority's
bright line test would have a chilling effect on the effective discharge
of a Congressman's official duties. He concluded that "members of
Congress, like other government officials, are entitled to avail them-
selves of the doctrine of official immunity. '"118
Representative Sundquist petitioned the court for a rehearing
with a suggestion of rehearing en banc. Sundquist argued that the
court's holding leaves legislators without any protection whatso-
ever. 119 He concluded that the court's decision would inhibit the
effective functioning of the legislative branch. 120 Although six
judges voted in favor of rehearing, the court denied Sundquist's
petition. 121
112 Id. at 315.
113 Id. at 316.
114 Id. See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
115 Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 328 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 330 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
117 See infra notes 147-82 and accompanying text.
118 Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 333 (Mikva, J., dissenting). The majority's refusal to ex-
tend the doctrine of official immunity to members of Congress conflicts with decisions in
other circuits. See Hartley v. Fine, 780 F.2d 1383 (8th Cir. 1985); Kuzinich v. County of
Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1982);Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir.
1975).
119 Appellant's Petition for a Rehearing at 1, Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311
(D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2914 (1988).
120 Id. at 5-6.
121 Rehearing required the vote of a majority of the twelve judges in active service
rather than just a majority of the eleven judges voting. Although he was still officially a
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D. Aftermath
Following the court of appeals' denial of Representative Sund-
quist's petition for rehearing, the House of Representatives unani-
mously passed a privileged resolution requesting the Supreme
Court to grant certiorari.' 22 The resolution stated that the divided
panel's decision "will have an adverse effect on the performance of
important official duties by Members of the House and will deprive
citizens of an irreplaceable source of information about the func-
tioning of their government .... ,,123 Six weeks after the House
expressed its desire to obtain review of the court of appeals deci-
sion, the Supreme Court denied Representative Sundquist's petition
for a writ of certiorari. 24
III
ANALYSIS
In Chastain v. Sundquist, the split panel of the court of appeals
gave an unduly restrictive interpretation of the doctrine of legisla-
tive immunity. The court's opinion exhibits several flaws. First, the
court's narrow definition of legislative activity reflects a "lack of un-
derstanding of the essential elements of the legislative process and
the representative role of the legislative branch."' 125 Second, the
court misconceived the "functional approach" to immunity ques-
tions. Third, the court failed to consider adequately the important
policy considerations underlying legislative immunity. The court's
decision will have a chilling effect on the willingness of members of
Congress to tackle controversial matters outside the confines of the
legislative chamber. The resultant fear of litigation might dissuade
even the most zealous member from fulfilling his constitutional obli-
gations. To counter the harmful effects of Sundquist, Congress
should enact a statutory grant of legislative immunity.
A. Definition of Protected Legislative Activity
The court's conclusion that the speech or debate clause is the
member of the court, Judge Bork did not participate in the vote. He had already an-
nounced his departure from the bench.
122 H.R. RES. 446, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H3188 (1988).
Privileged legislation receives special status in the Senate and House of Representa-
tives. Specifically, privileged legislation qualifies for immediate debate, thus ensuring
prompt consideration and action. JEFFREY ELLIOT & SHEIKH R. ALl, THE PRESIDENTIAL-
CONGRESSIONAL POLInCAL DICTIONARY 286-87 (1984).
123 H.R. RES. 446, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. H3188 (1988).
124 108 S. Ct. 2914 (1988). Justices White, Blackmun, and O'Connor voted to grant
certiorari.
125 Sam J. Ervin, Jr., The Gravel and Brewster Cases: An Assault on Congressional Inde-
pendence, 59 VA. L. REv. 175, 186 (1973).
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only source of immunity for members of Congress effectively col-
lapsed the two prongs of the doctrine of legislative immunity into a
single, bright line test.' 26 The majority's myopic approach prema-
turely determined that Representative Sundquist's defense of offi-
cial immunity was without merit. 127 It erroneously assumed that the
speech or debate clause provides elected representatives with suffi-
cient protection from vexatious litigation. The court's holding thus
rested entirely on whether Representative Sundquist acted within
the sphere of protected legislative activity.
The court characterized Representative Sundquist's letters to
the Attorney General and the LSC as attempts to influence the con-
duct of executive agencies and concluded that such activities fell
outside the ambit of the speech or debate clause.1 28 The majority
stated that the clause "does not protect acts that are not 'legislative
in nature,' even if they are taken in a member's 'official capac-
ity.' 129 This position ignores the fact that members of Congress
are in daily contact with executive agencies in an effort to "bridge
the gap between the federal government and the citizens" they rep-
resent.'30 The Sundquist decision not only cuts off Congress from
the executive, it also cuts off the people from Congress.' 3 '
The court mechanically applied the Supreme Court's distinc-
tion between political and legislative activities.' 3 2 Writing for the
majority, Judge Buckley stated, "When [members of Congress]
move beyond the requirements of their legislative responsibilities,
they do so as volunteers, and at their own risk... ."133 Judge Buck-
ley's designation of members of Congress as "volunteers" reflects
an anachronistic view of the functions of the legislative branch.
Members of Congress perform a variety of non-legislative tasks nec-
essary to make the government more responsive to its citizenry.' 3 4
For example, the court's narrow definition of legislative activity
poses a significant threat to the investigative and informing func-
tions of Congress. The legislative process gives Congress the inher-
ent power to investigate.' 35 The investigative function includes
congressional inquiry into the executive branch "to expose corrup-
126 This Note argues that the doctrine of legislative immunity includes both speech
or debate clause immunity and the judicially created doctrine of official immunity.
127 Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 328 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
128 Id at 314.
129 Id (quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972)).
130 134 CONG. REC. H3190 (daily ed. May 12, 1988) (joint statement of Rep. Foley
and Rep. Michel).
131 See Ervin, supra note 125, at 188.
132 See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
133 Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 328.
134 Id. at 332 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
135 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
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tion, inefficiency or waste." 136 The informing function of Congress
occupies a position of equal importance.' 3 7 In his classic study of
Congress, Woodrow Wilson argued that "[ilt is the proper duty of a
representative body to look diligently into every affair of govern-
ment and to talk much about what it sees."' 38 The court's narrow
definition of legislative activity ignores the value of the investigative
and informing functions of Congress.
The Supreme Court's decision in Gravel v. United States ' 39 illus-
trates the consequences of a narrow definition of legislative activity
on the informing function of Congress. In Gravel, the Court held
that Senator Gravel's arrangement for private publication of The
Pentagon Papers had no connection with the legislative process.' 40
Justice Douglas's dissent sharply criticized the Court's reasoning.' 4 '
He stated that publication of the Pentagon Papers "was but another
way of informing the public as to what had gone on in the privacy of
the Executive Branch concerning the conception and pursuit of the
so-called 'war' in Vietnam."'1 42 In a separate dissent, Justice Bren-
nan argued that the Court should not restrict the definition of legis-
lative activity merely because a member of Congress may reveal
information which embarrasses the other branches of government
or violates their notions of secrecy.' 43
A narrow definition of legislative activity strips members of
Congress of immunity for the acquisition and publication of infor-
mation about the administration's activities. 144 The Gravel decision
thus insulates the executive branch from congressional and public
scrutiny.' 45 This result conflicts with the long-standing tradition of
unfettered communication between members of Congress and the
American people.' 46 During his tenure as Attorney General, Ram-
say Clark emphasized the importance of this give-and-take between
legislators and their constituents: "If government is to be truly of,
by, and for the people, the people must know in detail the activities
136 Id.
137 See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 652 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("The informing function ... is essential to the continued vitality of our democratic
institutions.").
138 WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 198 (1885).
139 408 U.S. 606 (1972). See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
140 Gravel, 408 U.S. at 626.
141 Id. at 633-48 (Douglas, J, dissenting).
142 Id at 633.
143 Id. at 662 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144 Ervin, supra note 125, at 187.
145 Id. at 194.
146 See United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596, 601 (6th Cir. 1987) (Judicial interference
in communications between members of Congress and their constituents "would tend to
undermine the representiative nature of the democratic process and the legislator's re-
sponsibility to the electorate to account for his actions.").
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of government."147
B. Functional Approach to Immunity Questions
A functional approach to immunity questions requires the ap-
plication of the doctrine of official immunity to members of Con-
gress. The Supreme Court has consistently applied a functional
approach to immunity questions.' 48 Under such an approach,
courts examine the nature of an official's functions and evaluate
whether exposure to liability would inhibit the appropriate exercise
of those functions.' 49
The Sundquist court's reliance on a speech or debate clause anal-
ysis ignored the option of extending the doctrine of official immu-
nity to members of Congress.' 50 The fact that the Constitution
provides members of Congress with absolute immunity for their leg-
islative actions does not compel the conclusion that courts should
provide no other immunity.' 5 ' This reasoning would leave mem-
bers of Congress more exposed to litigation than all other public
officials.' 52
The Sundquist court's decision reflects a basic misconception of
the functional approach to immunity questions. All members of
Congress must write to Cabinet officers and provide their constitu-
ents with information. 53 Congress handles over a million constitu-
147 Attorney General's Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 20 ADMIN. L. REV. 263, 264 (1967), quoted in Gravel, 408 U.S.
at 641 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also 134 CONG. REC. H3192 (daily ed. May 12, 1988)
(statement of Rep. Schumer) ("The intrusion by the [Sundquist] court ... into this funda-
mental process of give and take between the Congress and the people must be
undone.").
148 See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988) ("Running through our cases,
with fair consistency, is a 'functional' approach to immunity questions .... ); see also
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 810 (1982) ("[O]ur cases have followed a 'func-
tional' approach to immunity [questions].").
149 Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224.
150 See Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 330 (Mikva, J., dissenting):
In limiting the application of Speech or Debate Clause immunity to mat-
ters within the legislative sphere, the Supreme Court has neither explic-
itly nor implicitly negated the application of judicially created official
immunity to activities outside that sphere. Speech or Debate immunity
and judicially created official immunity offer distinctly different
protections.
See also supra note 115 and accompanying text.
151 See 134 CONG. REc. H3189 (daily ed. May 12, 1988) (statement of Rep. Foley):
The majority [in Sundquist] reasoned that since the Constitution provides
Members with an absolute immunity for their legislation actions, no other
immunity should be provided. This reasoning leaves Members, who are
the only officials the framers of the Constitution believed required an im-
munity, more exposed to litigation than all other public officials.
152 Id. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
153 See 134 CONG. REC. H3190 (daily ed. May 12, 1988) (statement of Rep. Michel).
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ent cases each year.154 The cases require extensive communication
with constituents and agencies. 155 As one member of Congress re-
cently stated, "The help we give constituents is a vital part of their
lives, and a major part of our responsibility in holding office."'' 5 6
The court's decision not to extend official immunity to members of
Congress poses a significant threat to the continuation of this essen-
tial function.
Representative Sundquist's efforts to call attention to problems
within the MALS were part of his job, and his letters to the Attorney
General and the LSC were part of that effort. 157 Sundquist and
other members of Congress should have the freedom to investigate
suspected improprieties in federally funded programs without the
fear of potential liability for unwarranted defamation claims.' 58
C. Important Policy Considerations
Compelling public policy considerations provide the infrastruc-
ture for both prongs of the doctrine of legislative immunity. Legis-
lative immunity does not represent a personal privilege or
perquisite of office. 159 As Justice Frankfurter stated in Tenney v.
Brandhove,160 "Legislators are immune from deterrents to the unin-
hibited discharge of their legislative duty, not for their indulgence
but for the public good."' 161
An examination of the proper boundaries of legislative immu-
nity requires a balancing of the public interest in the protection of
individuals from attacks upon their reputations "against the public
interest in the free dissemination of information about government
activities."' 162 Although courts traditionally resolved this conflict in
favor of absolute protection for officials, l63 recent cases, such as
Sundquist, have lessened this protection. 1' 4
154 Id. at H3191 (statement of Rep. Gejdenson).
155 Id. at H3190 (joint statement of Rep. Foley and Rep. Michel) ("Each of us is in
daily contact with Executive agencies and with our constituents. Part of our task is to
bridge the gap between the federal government and the citizens we represent.").
156 Id. at H3191 (statement of Rep. Gejdenson).
157 Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 329 (MikvaJ., dissenting).
158 134 CONG. REC. H3193 (daily ed. May 12, 1988) (statement of Rep. Hughes).
159 Hearings, pt. 1, supra note 61, at 2 (statement of Sen. Metcalf); see also W. PAGE
KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 16, at 109 (5th ed. 1984) (Privilege "signifies that the defendant
has acted to further an interest of such social importance that it is entitled to protection,
even at the expense of damage to the plaintiff."); supra note 89 and accompanying text.
160 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
161 Id. at 377.
162 Handler & Klein, supra note 76, at 44.
163 See Note, Qualified Immunity for Federal Officials: A Proposed Standard for Defamation
Cases, 58 TEx. L. REV. 789 (1980) (authored by BruceJones).
164 Id.
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The Sundquist court's refusal to extend official immunity to
members of Congress conflicts with sound public policy.' 65 Expos-
ing members of Congress to civil liability undermines the effective
functioning of the legislative branch.' 66 The court's decision re-
stricts the ability of members of Congress to participate in public
debate on controversial issues.' 67 It will have a chilling effect on the
ability of individual members to represent their constituencies ade-
quately. 16s Constituents "will never know whether the threat of a
suit has prevented [their] representative from criticizing executive
action or revealing information about executive programs."' 69 The
threat of litigation might appreciably inhibit the fearless, vigorous,
and effective administration of government policies. 170
The Sundquist majority failed to recognize the consequences of
inviting litigation against members of Congress.171 The social costs
of such suits "include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of
official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of
165 See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 576 (1959) (emphasis added):
We are told that we should forbear from sanctioning any such rule of
absolute privilege lest it open the door to wholesale oppression and
abuses on the part of unscrupulous government officials.... To be sure,
as with any rule of law which attempts to reconcile fundamentally antago-
nistic social policies, there may be occasional instances of actual injustice
which will go unredressed, but we think that price a necessary one to pay for the
greater good.
166 Ervin, supra note 125, at 191.
167 134 CONG. REC. H3193 (daily ed. May 12, 1988) (statement of Rep. Lott); see also
Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 136 (1966) ("Legislators have an obligation to take posi-
tions on controversial political questions so that their constituents can be fully informed
of them .... ).
168 Hearings, pt. 1, supra note 61, at 77 (statement of Sen. Fulbright). Fifteen years
ago, Representative Brooks gave a graphic description of the "chilling effect"
phenomenon:
If I am acting at my peril everytime I send a news release to my con-
gressional district or give an interview or make a speech in Beaumont,
Tex., on a matter of concern in the Congress, then wisdom might dictate
that I not share that information.
If, before I speak outside the Halls of Congress, I must first consider
whether I may offend someone in the executive branch who may prefer
that the public not know how he is botching up his job, or that I may be
called to account before ajudicial body of inquiry, is it not the better role
for me not to say anything?
But what happens then to my representative responsibility to keep
my constituents informed about their Government?
Id. at 7-8 (statement of Rep. Brooks).
169 Id. at 77 (statement of Sen. Fulbright).
170 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959); see also Forrester v. White, 484 U.S.
219, 233 (1988) (The threat of litigation may induce some members of Congress "to
skew their decisions in ways that result in less than full fidelity to the objective and in-
dependent criteria that ought to guide their conduct.").
171 See 134 CONG. REC. H3193 (daily ed. May 12, 1988) (statement ofRep. Lott) ("I
do think [Sundquist] is a forerunner of what could be a whole number of this type of
lawsuits being brought against Members of Congress to tie us up and to shut us up.").
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able citizens from acceptance of public office."' 72 The Sundquist de-
cision will have a particularly harmful effect on the informing func-
tion of Congress. 173 Members of Congress have a duty to keep the
public informed on matters of national or local importance. 174 In
our society, where political power resides in the people, an impor-
tant interest exists in general knowledge of the affairs of the govern-
ment. 175 The people look to their elected representatives to speak
for them. Informing constituents thus represents a vital, basic, and
essential function for any member of Congress. 176 If members of
Congress cannot speak freely within the bounds of their official du-
ties, they will become less able to represent the people who elected
them to serve.
Courts could not grant a measure of official immunity to mem-
bers of Congress without imposing some costs.' 77 Absolute immu-
nity from suits alleging common law claims effectively would leave
uncompensated a number of innocent and aggrieved claimants.
Nevertheless, the benefits of unrestrained public debate and effec-
tive representation outweigh the risk that members of Congress will
unjustly damage the reputation of some individuals.'78 Judge
Learned Hand summarized the policy reasons underlying the grant
of official immunity:
[T]o submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the
burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome,
would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most
irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.... In
this instance it has been thought in the end better to leave un-
redressed the wrongs done by dishonest officials than to subject
those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of
retaliation. ' 79
Sundquist also represents a situation in which sufficient inherent
safeguards exist to protect an individual's interest without the col-
lateral remedy of a tort action for defamation. 180 Wayne Chastain
even pursued several non-judicial remedies before he brought suit
against Representative Sundquist. He wrote a letter to the Attorney
172 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982); see also United States v. Helstoski,
635 F.2d 200, 205 (3d Cir. 1980) (describing effects of bad publicity).
173 See supra notes 137-47 and accompanying text.
174 See S. 1314, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 119 CONG. REc. 9089 (1973).
175 Handler & Klein, supra note 76, at 61.
176 134 CONG. REC. H3190 (daily ed. May 12, 1988) (statement of Rep. Michel).
177 Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 333 (MikvaJ., dissenting).
178 See Comment, Legislative Immunity and Congressional Necessity, 68 GE. oL.J. 783, 798
(1980) (authored by Jeff Turner).
179 Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949
(1950).
180 Handler & Klein, supra note 76, at 45.
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General' 81 and discussed the underlying dispute between MALS
and the juvenile court at the monthly meeting of the Kennedy Dem-
ocratic Club.' 8 2 He had ample opportunity to redress his grievances
outside the judicial system. Constituents in Chastain's position also
have the means to hold members of Congress accountable at the
ballot box. 183
D. Need for Congressional Action
Sundquist illustrates the need for congressional action to "re-
store itself as a co-equal branch of government .... , 184 The court's
narrow definition of legislative activity foreclosed the possibility of
protection under the speech or debate clause. The court's all-or-
nothing approach to immunity questions also blocked the official
immunity route. As a result, Congress should enact a statutory
grant of legislative immunity. The court even invited Congress to
take action if it disagreed with its opinion: "If members of Congress
in fact believe they require the protection of official immunity, let
them so declare and stand accountable to the people for their
action."1 85
Congress responded to the court's invitation. In an extraordi-
nary show of bipartisan support, the House of Representatives
unanimously passed a privileged resolution requesting that the
Supreme Court grant Representative Sundquist's petition for a writ
of certiorari.' 8 6 The resolution set forth two primary reasons for
the extension of official immunity to members of Congress. First,
the House stated that the official duties of a member included in-
forming citizens and executive branch officials on matters of public
notice.' 8 7 Second, the House stated that courts should treat mem-
bers engaged in the performance of their official duties with the
same respect and protection as all other public officials.' 8 The
Court's subsequent refusal to grant certiorari leaves Congress with
the difficult task of fashioning a remedy to rectify the decision of the
court of appeals.
181 Brief for Appellee at 4, Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(No. 86-5386), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2914 (1988).
182 Id.
183 See Comment, supra note 178, at 799; see also Hearings, pt. 1, supra note 60, at 4
(statement of Sen. Metcalf).
184 Ervin, supra note 125, at 194.
185 Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 327 ("[C]ongressional power could be hypothesized to ex-
ist to enact legislation immunizing members of Congress from common law torts.").
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Congress faced a similar impasse fifteen years ago.18 9 The fo-
cus of the Joint Committee's 1973 inquiry serves as an appropriate
starting point for the post-Sundquist period. Senator Metcalf opened
the Committee's inquiry with the question, "What, if anything, can
the Congress do to restore the doctrine of constitutional immunity
for legislators to its appropriate place in the law, where it serves as
the bulwark for the Congress against challenges to its independence
and integrity of action?"' 90 Sundquist reveals the potential conse-
quences of further congressional inaction.
Congress has the power to create a statutory grant of legislative
immunity.' 9 ' In his testimony before the Joint Committee fifteen
years ago, former Justice Goldberg stated that the Constitution
"clearly authorize[s] Congress to enact carefully and properly drawn
legislation to shield appropriate legislative activities-and to restrict
accountability for congressional misconduct in discharging such leg-
islative activities to Congress itself."' 192 Professors Alexander
BickelF93 and Philip Kurland' 94 also testified that Congress could
statutorily define its immunity on firm constitutional ground, with
the caveat that, in the area of immunity from civil proceedings, a
limitation exists that any such legislated protection could not in-
fringe on an individual's constitutional rights. 195
In 1973, Senator Ervin introduced a bill' 96 in response to the
189 See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
190 REPORT, supra note 60, at 2 (statement of Sen. Metcalf).
191 See Reinstein & Silvergate, supra note 12, at 1179:
[A] practical means for effectuating that degree of privilege which is
necessary for Congress to function without unwarranted executive and
judicial interference would appear to be the passage of an appropriate
statute. Since Congress has the undoubted power to define the scope of
the criminal law and to regulate the jurisdiction and procedure of the
federal courts, it possesses ample power to protect its members from de-
cisions such as Brewster and Gravel.
192 See Hearings, pt. 1, supra note 61, at 57 (statement of formerJustice Goldberg):
Article I, section 1, of the Constitution provides: 'All legislative pow-
ers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,
which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.' Article I,
section 8, of the Constitution, in the necessary and proper clause, vests in
Congress the power 'To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.'
193 Late Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
194 Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
195 Constitutional Immunity of Members of Congress: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Con-
gressional Operations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 82-83 (1973) [hereinafter Hearings,
pt. 2].
196 S. 1314, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 9089-90 (1973). Senator Gravel
also sponsored legislation in response to the Supreme Court's decisions in Brewster and
Gravel. S. 1726, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 14,456-64 (1973). The Senate did
not vote on either bill.
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Supreme Court's narrow definition of legislative activity. Senator
Ervin defined legislative activity as
any activity relating to the due functioning of the legislative pro-
cess and carrying out the obligations a Member of Congress owes
to the Congress and to his constituents and shall include, but not
be limited to, speaking, debating or voting in Committee or on
the floor of Congress, receipt of information for use in legislative
proceedings, any conduct in Committee related to the considera-
tion of legislation or related to the conduct of an investigation,
speeches, or publications outside of Congress informing the pub-
lic on matters of national or local importance, and the motives
and decision-making process leading to the above activity or lead-
ing to the decision not to engage in the above activity. 197
Political considerations during the Watergate affair explain why the
Senate never scheduled a vote on Senator Ervin's bill. The Senate
wanted to avoid the politically unacceptable result of expanding the
legislative privilege while challenging President Nixon's use of the
executive privilege. 198
Legislative immunity is a bipartisan issue that merits the atten-
tion of every member of Congress. Nevertheless, Congress can ex-
pect to face significant opposition to any statutory grant of
legislative immunity. The public's outcry in early 1989 over plans
for a 51% pay hike for top government officials, including members
of Congress, illustrates the inherent difficulty in securing passage of
this type of legislation. 199 Members of Congress fear that voters will
interpret a grant of immunity as a license to defame. 200 Congress-
men, however, should not fear a voter backlash on this issue.20 1
Sound public policy considerations support a statutory grant of leg-
islative immunity.
20 2
Absent a congressional grant of immunity, the court's decision
in Sundquist will have an adverse effect on the day-to-day operation
of the legislative branch. Congress should therefore enact legisla-
tion which will protect fully its "legislative powers and preroga-
197 S. 1314, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 119 CONG. REc. 9089 (1973).
198 See REPORT, supra note 60, at 41-43.
199 H.R.J. Res. 129, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). The resolution failed to pass
either the Senate (6-94) or the House of Representatives (48-380).
200 See Sundquist, 833 F.2d at 324 ("[I]n the heat of political contest, an immunity
from suit for common law libel becomes a license to libel.").
201 See, e.g., Mike Mills, Raising Members' Pay: A 200-Year Dilemma, 47 CONG. Q. 209-
12 (weekly ed. Feb. 4, 1989). Mills stated, "IT]he overall record of voter retaliation
shows more smoke than fire: With two exceptions [1816 and 1873], it is rare for voters
to punish members at the polls solely because of their pay-raise votes." Id. at 209.
202 Hearings, pt. 1, supra note 61, at 57 (statement of former Justice Goldberg); see
supra notes 159-83 and accompanying text.
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tives." 20 3 Such legislation should include Senator Ervin's definition
of legislative activity. 20 4 Representative Sundquist's statements on
the MALS controversy would constitute "informing the public on
matters of... local importance" under the Ervin definition.205 The
legislation should also inform the public of the necessity of a statu-
tory grant of immunity. Congress must not create the image of a
body trying to place itself in a privileged position above the law. 20 6
A broad interpretation of the doctrine of legislative immunity
carries with it the responsibility that Congress "keep its house in
order." 20 7 Article I, section 5, of the Constitution provides that
"each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly Behavior, and with the Concurrence of two-
thirds, expel a Member." 208 This power has a broad reach, ex-
tending to all cases where, in the judgment of the House or Senate,
the offense "is inconsistent with the trust and duty of a member. '20 9
Ideally, Article I, section 5, precludes any member of Congress
"from claiming to be above the law because he occupies a position
203 Id. at 56.
204 See supra note 197 and accompanying text; see also Reinstein & Silvergate, supra
note 12, at 1179:
For the purpose of this statute, 'legislative activities' should be de-
fined as any activity relating to the due functioning of the legislative pro-
cess and the carrying out of a member's obligations to his house and his
constituents. The following should be included specifically: speeches,
debates, and votes; conduct in committee; receipt of information for use
in legislative proceedings; publications and speeches made outside of Congress to
inform the public on matters of national or local importance; and the decision-
making processes behind each of the above.
205 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
206 Hearings, pt. 1, supra note 61, at 270-71 (statement of Rep. Cleveland):
[A]s Congressmen we don't want the public to feel that what we're trying
to do in staking out this legislative immunity is setting ourselves aside as
privileged citizens who can drive a car 90 miles an hour through a 35-
mile-an-hour-zone.
What we're trying to point out is that this is the guts of representa-
tive government, and what we're trying to do is insure that if we do our
proper job, we're protected ....
Id. at 270. But see REPORT, supra note 60, at 26 (statement of Sen. Helms):
I am deeply disturbed by the present day tendency in many quarters
to broaden the scope and make absolute the privilege of immunity from
prosecution or proper inquiry. The ultimate effect of this tendency will
be to create a certain elite of privileged classes who are above the law and
beyond the scope of effective scrutiny and restraint.
207 Hearings, pt. 1, supra note 61, at 4 (statement of Sen. Metcalf; see also REPORT,
supra note 60, at 52 ("Congressional action to define legislative activities to reflect the
reasonable scope of activities expected of a Member of Congress carries with it the abso-
lutely essential requirement that the Congress do better than it has to discharge its con-
stitutional self-disciplinary role."); see generally Gerald T. McLaughlin, Congressional Self-
Discipline: The Power to Expel, to Exclude, and to Punish, 41 FoRDHI. L. REv. 43 (1972).
208 U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 5.
209 In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 669-70 (1897).
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of trust in an elective, legislative office." 210
Congress should exercise this power and hold its members ac-
countable for their legislative misconduct. In his dissent in United
States v. Brewster, Justice Brennan emphasized the need for self-disci-
pline. He stated:
[W]e are guilty of a grave disservice to both Nation and Constitu-
tion when we permit Congress to shirk its responsibility in favor
of the courts. The Framers' judgment was that the American peo-
ple could have a Congress of independence and integrity only if
alleged misbehavior in the performance of legislative functions
was accountable solely to a Member's own House and never to the
executive or judiciary.211
In addition to self-discipline, the discipline of the public referendum
remains an effective deterrent to legislative misconduct. 212
Congress can not afford to let another fifteen years elapse with-
out taking actiOn. 2 13 If the scope of protected activities is to bear
any reasonable relationship to contemporary duties and responsibil-
ities of legislative office, a legislative remedy is required. Sundquist
magnifies the importance of timely consideration of this significant
issue.
CONCLUSION
In Chastain v. Sundquist, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that the judicially created doctrine of official
immunity did not extend to members of Congress. The court's nar-
row reading of the doctrine of legislative immunity will have an ad-
verse effect on the performance of important official duties by
members of Congress and will deprive citizens of an irreplaceable
source of information about the functioning of their government.
The majority's all-or-nothing approach to immunity questions sets a
dangerous precedent. The split panel's position that it cannot con-
sider the question of congressional common law immunity indepen-
dently of the speech or debate clause ignores the obvious
application of the judicially created doctrine of official immunity to
the facts in Sundquist. Members of Congress acting within the scope
of their official authority should have recourse to either speech or
debate clause immunity or the judicially created doctrine of official
immunity. If the courts fail to provide this necessary safeguard,
210 REPORT, supra note 60, at 52.
211 United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 550 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
212 REPORT, supra note 60, at 52.
213 See Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 195, at 91 (statement of Prof. Bickel) ("[Tjhe Court
quite properly through the decision threw the ball back to Congress.").
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then Congress must act to protect the citizenry's primary represen-
tative in the federal government.
Richard D. Batchelder, Jr.
